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Editor's Note

Welcome to the third volume of *The George Washington University Historical Review*. After another year of competitive submissions, our review team has selected four compelling research essays for publication.

This issue spans over three centuries of history from all over the world—Cuba, Italy, China, and colonial America. Covering the latter half of the seventeenth-century to the late twentieth-century, this issue examines the Cuban intervention in the Angolan Civil War from the perspective of volunteer soldiers, the impact of Fascist Italy's anti-Jewish legislation during World War II, the U.S. government's controlled-release of information during the Cold War, and the role of the Connecticut River Indians in King Philip's War.

We would like to thank our faculty advisor, Professor Tyler Anbinder, for his expert guidance and unwavering support. He demands the best from us, and to him we owe the success and esteem of this journal. We would also like to thank the History Department and its professors for their time and expertise to ensure that this publication always showcases exceptional undergraduate scholarship. Lastly, we commend authors John Broderick, Isabella M. Fazio, Ryan Nassar, and Yusuf Mansoor for their effort and patience in trusting us to publish their work. On behalf of all authors, editors, and advisors, we hope you enjoy our 2019-2020 edition.

Alison Beachman

Editor-in-Chief

“PROFOUND UNMERCENARIES”

The Experience of Cuban Foreign Fighters in Angola

By John Broderick

In the minds of Cuban citizens, Cuba's intervention in the Angolan Civil War remains one of the most significant events in the country's history. Cuba's decision to send financial aid, and a significant portion of their soldiers, doctors, and teachers, to assist Angola seemed contrary to political realities as the nation suffered domestic turmoil and economic downturn due to an American trade embargo. Even more peculiar are the hundreds of thousands of ordinary Cubans who volunteered to fight in a far-flung country's civil war on another continent. The experiences and opinions of ordinary Cubans who volunteered for the war can be traced through memoirs, testimonials, and news articles from local journalists. The motivations of Cubans and how their views changed throughout the course of the war can be traced by analyzing thoughts and opinions of soldiers and civilian volunteers as the conflict developed throughout the 1970s. Likewise, an examination of the repatriated volunteers, who brought their experiences back to Cuba through political and cultural expression, reveals how Cubans who volunteered for the Angolan War were driven largely by ideological motivations, however, their varied levels of participation in the war produced different effects on the political opinions and ideologies of the foreign fighters. The Cuban intervention into Angola remains an understudied field in the

history of decolonization.¹ Through an analysis of the motivations and ideologies of the Cuban volunteers over the course of the war, the reactions of average people in developing countries to the global process of decolonization can be better understood.

Background

Cuba had already developed a reputation for internationalism by the time of its intervention in the Angolan Civil War in 1975. In the period since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Castro's government had sent financial assistance, equipment, doctors, teachers, and training officers to dozens of governments and national liberation movements in Africa.² During the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) decade-long struggle against Portuguese imperialism in Angola in 1965, Cuba sent various forms of aid to the movement, but refrained from direct military intervention even when the conflict descended into civil war after the retreat of the Portuguese in 1975. After South Africa, under the dictatorship of the racist Apartheid regime, invaded Angola to support its ally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Cuban government feared that South Africa would

¹ While a fairly substantial body of literature has developed concerning the rationale and decisions of the Cuban government leadership, due largely to the impeccable scholarship of Piero Gleijeses, comparatively little has been written that examines the perspective of the soldiers who fought in the war. I have depended on the works of Joey Whitefield and Marisabel Almer for their analysis of how returning veterans constructed social metanarratives about the experience of the war. I have also taken advantage of Edward George's excellent analysis of living conditions for foreign fighters in Angola, but I challenge his dismissal of ideological motivations for volunteers. The substantive number of interviews that Almer and George conducted for their papers provides a wealth of information for understanding the first-hand experiences of the Cuban soldiers.

² Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "Operation Carlota: Cuba's Role in Angola's Victory," *New Left Review*, trans. Patrick Camiller, 1977, <https://newleftreview.org/issues/1101/articles/gabriel-garcia-marquez-operation-carlota.pdf>.; Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 30-214.

spread Apartheid to Angola and reimpose the old colonial system on the nation.³ Therefore, in November of 1975, Castro's government decided to send Cuban troops to Angola to fight for the MPLA. The Cuban government began a recruitment drive for the mission that would come to be known as "Operation Carlota," named after the leader of a Cuban slave rebellion. It was by far the largest military operation the nation had undertaken since its revolution—nearly 400,000 Cubans (about 5 percent of the country's population) went to Angola at some point during the fifteen-year operation.⁴ The scope of the operation would require a significant mobilization of volunteers from Cuban society.

Calls for Volunteers

The Cuban government relied on volunteers to complete Operation Carlota due to the small size of the Cuban standing army, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). The operation was the first time FAR had to request civilian participation for an international mission. The military took fighting volunteers from the national reserves and humanitarian volunteers (doctors, teachers, etc.) from the non-enlisted populace. Ordinary people, both civilians and reservists, would form the backbone of the mission. Even the Communist Party was surprised by the civilian response to volunteer as hundreds of thousands of people from various classes and occupations presented themselves to offer their service. The novelist and journalist

³ Joey Whitefield, "Narratives of Internationalism in Angola. Myths, 'Testimonio,' Fiction," *International Journal of Cuban Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 2010): 5; Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale: a Detailed Study of Cuban Internationalism and the Angolan War* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 140.

⁴ Whitefield, "Narratives of Internationalism in Angola: Myths, 'Testimonio,' Fiction," 1; Raul Castro, "Raul Castro Welcomes Internationalists" (speech, Havana, May 27, 1991), LANIC, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1991/19910527.html>.

Gabriel Garcia Marquez noted that the government was barely able “to prevent the conversion of this massive solicitude into a state of national disorder.” Cuban eagerness was evident by the people who used various tactics to ensure that they were sent among the first wave to Angola. For example, a skilled engineer disguised himself as a taxi driver, and a Communist Party bureaucrat pretended to be a mechanic. Another young man who snuck away from his home at night to join the volunteers later, unexpectedly, encountered his father in Angola. The recruitment drive experienced an extraordinary amount of initial success.⁵

There was also a gender dimension to the volunteer recruitment process. Despite many women’s eagerness to fight, the selection committee overwhelmingly drafted men. One woman nearly succeeded in disguising herself as a man in order to be selected.⁶ Esther Lilia Díaz Rodríguez, a Cuban folk hero who slipped past the committees’ filter, was the most famous woman who went to Angola. Esther Lilia, a 23-year-old teacher, applied many times to the military committees, but was consistently rejected because of her gender. Committed to going to Angola regardless, she stowed herself away on a ship, only to find out just before the ship departed that she had been legally accepted to go with the army to Angola. She served with great distinction.⁷ When the American poet Margaret Randall wrote a poem about Esther Lilia, it became overwhelmingly popular, and riotous crowds from all over the island came to hear her read it.⁸ Anecdotes like these shows how the excitement for the Angolan War reached not only the men but also the women of Cuba.

⁵ Garcia Marquez, “Operation Carlota.”

⁶ Garcia Marquez, “Operation Carlota.”

⁷ Garcia Marquez, “Operation Carlota.”

⁸ Margaret Randall, *To Change the World: My Years in Cuba* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 160; Garcia Marquez, “Operation Carlota.”

So, why were so many people so eager to volunteer, and why did this enthusiasm persist even as horrific stories of the war began to reach Cuba? For many Cubans, the primary reason was a feeling of kinship with Africa, specifically Angola, because some Cubans were descendants of slaves taken from Angola to Cuba. Castro and his government explicitly emphasized the existence of a blood link between Cubans and Angolans, which made Cuban support for the MPLA against South Africa a moral imperative and a historical necessity.⁹ Many ordinary Cubans, especially black Cubans and those of mixed race, believed wholeheartedly in this connection, so they responded *en masse* to the call for volunteers. For many Cubans of color, Angola was a symbol of their own identity, a home they might have resided had their ancestors not been sold as slaves.¹⁰ This sense of a pan-African racial identity that pervaded the Cuban consciousness is evidenced by the disproportionate number of black Cubans who volunteered. The black general Rafael Moracen Limonta recalls being shocked upon meeting his brigade, stating that “we were all blacks. I had never seen so many all together.”¹¹ Considering that most volunteers were black or of mixed race, racial reasoning clearly had a significant impact on the decision-making of Cuban volunteers.

The high volume of volunteers was also due to a sincere sense of internationalism based on socialist ideology. The government pushed the connection with Raul Castro, saying in a speech commemorating the war that “the solidarity, support, and fraternal cooperation that the consistent practice of internationalism gave us at decisive times created a sincere feeling: an

⁹ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 320-321.

¹⁰ Randall, *To Change the World: My Years in Cuba*, 160.

¹¹ Rafael Moracen Limonta, interview by Baez, Luiz in *Secretos de Generales*, Editorial Si-Mar (S.A.), Havana, 1996, 261.

awareness of a debt to other nations who might find themselves in similar circumstances.”¹²

Government statements reflect how the state promoted political consciousness—a key contributing factor to why young people were so willing to defend Angola. The Angolan mission also appealed to the Cuban youth because it provided the opportunity for a heroic adventure like that of their parents’ generation in the Cuban Revolution. Operation Carlota offered the chance for young, politically aware people to prove their bravery and revolutionary credentials. The new generation born after the fall of Batista saw themselves as part of a historical mission to defend the developing world from imperialism.¹³

Wartime Experiences

The experience of the international fighters in Angola varied significantly based on their deployment. The soldiers assigned to garrison the major cities away from the front line typically had little contact with the native population and stayed within their camps. The soldiers posted in these locations seemed to have had little development in their political or social views due to their isolation, largely reporting themselves as having been simply bored.¹⁴ Soldiers posted to the south, meanwhile, worked directly with MPLA troops to ward off UNITA guerillas, defuse mines, and defend outposts. The various traps laid by both sides presented significant challenges for the Cubans who were unfamiliar with the lay of the land.

¹² Raul Castro, “Raul Castro Welcomes Internationalists” (speech, Havana, May 27, 1991), LANIC, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1991/19910527.html>.

¹³ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 318.

¹⁴ George, 332.

The Cuban fighter known as El Palestino recalled how when an MPLA general castigated his brigade for arriving to an outpost two weeks late, his general replied: “For the last fifteen days we’ve been removing truckloads of landmines along the road that you laid so that we couldn’t pass through. We’ve been removing all those mines so that we can get through.”¹⁵ Like these traps, the challenges of the war contributed to the hardships that volunteers faced in Angola. Furthermore, the unfamiliar physical environment of Angola was a source of significant consternation for the Cubans. The Angolan jungle was one of the worst parts of their wartime experiences, according to their recollections. The Cuban international fighter known as El Habanero recalled how the difference in smells disoriented him: “I had never realized that Cuba had a smell until I smelled that place, it smelled of death... You knew a Cuban that had been there for a while because that smell had penetrated them. I couldn’t get the smell of Angola off of me no matter how many times I bathed; I couldn’t get that smell of Angola off of me. It took fifteen days.”¹⁶ As the war bogged down, ideological enthusiasm faded and the vision of Operation Carlota as a grand internationalist mission was lost, even as new volunteers continued to enter the Angolan War.¹⁷

By contrast, humanitarian workers, largely deployed in the middle of cities, found enormous success despite initial difficulties due to a language and cultural barrier. Cuban humanitarian workers helped lay the groundwork for Angola’s present-day social services. The success is reflected in the rapid expansion of the humanitarian mission in Angola, which grew at

¹⁵ El Palestino, interview by Marisabel Almer, in *Remembering Angola – Cuban Internationalism, Transnational Spaces, and the Politics of Memories*, University of Michigan, 2011, 165.

¹⁶ El Habanero, interview by Marisabel Almer, in *Remembering Angola – Cuban Internationalism, Transnational Spaces, and the Politics of Memories*, 116-117.

¹⁷ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 336-339

an average rate of 2.7 percent during its first five years. By 1980, there were up to 6,000 Cuban civilians working in Angola; this level remained more or less consistent for the entirety of the Cuban mission. These humanitarian workers were regularly exposed to the Angolan population and were heavily impacted by their interactions with locals. In later interviews, the Cuban humanitarian workers expressed an almost unanimous affection for their time spent in Angola. Thus, the different circumstances of service in Angola affected Cubans and their perceptions in different ways.¹⁸

Cubans faced many difficulties in adjusting to their new, Angolan environment. Non-black Cubans were regarded with hostility from some of the native population, since their appearance matched that of the natives' former colonial overlords. The legacy of colonialism and exploitation left many Angolans instinctively antagonistic toward white foreigners. The Cuban volunteers realized the validity of this hostility when they battled the South African army, which was institutionally racist even in its military practices. After battles, for example, the South African army would only retrieve the bodies of their white soldiers and leave the black soldiers' bodies to rot.¹⁹ These practices shocked Cuban soldiers, who were mostly black, and hardened their resolve to defeat the South Africans. El Palestino spoke of the brutal practices of the South African Defense Forces: "Like dumping cadavers in the waters, like using grenades to enter through doors and windows to kill people and bring them down."²⁰ His experience hardened his desire to win the war in Angola, because "these are things that one experiences that are against human principles. And these experiences strengthen anyone with feelings . . . [it] strengthens

¹⁸ George, 349-350.

¹⁹ Garcia Marquez, "Operation Carlota."

²⁰ El Palestino, interview.

your feelings as a Christian, as a person, and strengthens my revolutionary principles.”²¹ In this way, the conditions of the war helped to develop the political consciousness of the Cubans.

There was further trouble for the Cubans due to cultural differences with the Angolans, such as issues of communication. Although Portuguese and Spanish are ostensibly similar languages, the Cuban accent (which is notoriously difficult for foreigners to understand) and Angolan Portuguese are far from mutually-intelligible.²² Eloy Concepcion, a Cuban humanitarian doctor, explained how doctors sometimes needed up to four separate translators to communicate with patients who only spoke indigenous languages. Patients would reply to a question in Kuanhama to the translator, who then spoke to the nurse in Kimbundu, who then translated into Portuguese, and then into Spanish for the doctor. The Cubans did not feel an affinity for the MPLA fighters; they viewed them as untrustworthy and not properly devoted to the cause. For example, when on joint patrols, Cuban troops would always be preceded and followed by guerrillas of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) because they feared that MPLA traitors might attempt to shoot one of the Cubans in the back.²³ These tensions contributed to a growing disillusionment with the war among some soldiers and made it difficult for humanitarian workers to accomplish their duties.²⁴

Even ignoring the language barrier that existed between the two groups, Cubans were confused and sometimes even horrified by some of the Angolan indigenous practices.

²¹ El Palestino, interview.

²² George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 350.

²³ SWAPO consisted of Namibian volunteers who were also fighting against South Africa to liberate their country from Apartheid occupation; Interview with Cuban sapper appears in Edward George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale: a Detailed Study of Cuban Internationalism and the Angolan War*, 343.

²⁴ Eloy Concepcion, *Por Que Somos Internacionalistas* (Havana: Ediciones Politicas, 1987), 113.

Superstitions abounded in Angola, including a belief in magical charms and bracelets that were supposed to protect the wearer from bullets. Angolan distrust of doctors and reluctance to accept medicinal treatment was a source of frustration for the Cubans, who in one instance almost had to use force to treat a boy with a burn because his family believed that nothing could be done to help him. Cubans had to rely entirely on the advice of local guides to avoid dangerous wildlife and falling into traps set by UNITA guerrillas. A Cuban pediatrician in Puerto Amboim described being traumatized when five of his child patients died in a single day, since child mortality in Cuba was very low. These differences, struggles, and setbacks that Cuban volunteers experienced in Angola were difficult challenges to overcome, but eventually led to a closer unity between the Cubans and the Angolans as a result of the cooperation they engaged in to solve these problems.²⁵

Due to a variety of experiences among select groups, Cuban motivation underwent a significant transformation throughout the duration of the war. The idealism and excitement that initially stimulated recruitment for the war quickly faded as the difficulties of conflict set in. Cuban soldiers and humanitarian volunteers, thrust into an unfamiliar environment, realized their dependence on Angolan and Namibian cooperation and contributed to the development of political consciousness among impacted Cubans. The growing social awareness also stemmed from the nature of the conflict. The encounters of Cubans with institutional racism, guerrilla warfare tactics, and civil war resulted in a change in Cuban thought; the Cuban identity became more politically nuanced in a way that reflected the milieu of contrasting ideas. Consequently,

²⁵ George, *The Cuban Intervention in Angola*, 350.

these varying developments traveled back to Cuba when volunteers returned home from their deployments.

The Impact of the Soldiers' Return to Cuba

The decisive victories that the Cuban foreign fighters won early in the intervention, which forced the South African army to halt its invasion and retreat, were rapturously received back in Cuba. Cubans had suffered a litany of moral and strategic defeats in the past decade, including the murder of Che Guevara and the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile. The effusive joy of this significant victory for Cuba ensured that the first groups of returning soldiers were treated as national heroes upon repatriation. In the first years of the war, love for Angola spread like wildfire throughout Cuba as cultural artifacts brought back by soldiers were assimilated into the Cuban population. Portuguese words became slang, African rhythms dominated popular music, and the distinctive Angolan military outfit became fashionable with young men. The transnational ideology of socialist internationalism had brought about a transnational cultural exchange that altered the everyday activities of people on the island.²⁶

The soldiers returned with more than just new cultural knowledge. They also brought testimonials of their experiences. These *testimonios* became a separate subgenre in Cuban literature during the beginnings of the war, as a curious public devoured the tales of the volunteers. They offered fascinating insight into the reflections of the soldiers after their experiences in the war. The *testimonios* were overwhelmingly positive about experiences in Angola—government censorship played a role in the availability of positive public statements—

²⁶ George, 350.

but this official sanction should not entirely discount the opinions expressed in the testimonials. An example of a typical *testimonio* was like that of Raul Valdés Vivo. Valdés Vivo, assessing the spirit of his fellow internationalists, said: “Profound unmercenaries, revolutionary romantics, self-abnegating, sincere, standing in solidarity: these are our internationalist fighters!”²⁷ Regardless of the Cuban government’s censorship, it is difficult to deny that many soldiers returning from the war had a sincere sense of victory for the cause of justice in Angola. The defeat of Apartheid South Africa was especially a point of pride for black Cubans. According to El Palestino, the experience in Angola “taught me many things, it taught me how people outside my country think, how other people think. So yes, I think it truly helped me.”²⁸ Other available *testimonios*, like Valdés Vivo’s and El Palestino’s, exemplified the pride Cubans felt in their contributions to improving the world community.²⁹

Conclusion

The Cuban intervention into Angola drew ordinary Cubans into a whirlwind of competing social and political ideologies. Cuban volunteers brought their own experience with Marxist-Leninist governance into an environment where various forms of nationalism, based in either capitalism or socialism, competed for leadership of the anti-colonial movement. Cubans confronted the racist colonialism of Apartheid South Africa and struggled to adapt to a foreign

²⁷ This use of the word “unmercenaries” is likely a reference to the Christian tradition of “unmercenary saints” who would provide professional or humanitarian services to needy people without accepting repayment. The notion that the Cubans were helping the Angolans without expecting anything in return is central to the Cuban mythology of the Angolan War; Raúl Valdés Vivó, *Angola: Fin del Mito de los Mercenarios* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976), 10.

²⁸ El Palestino, interview.

²⁹ Whitefield, “Narratives of Internationalism in Angola: Myths, ‘*Testimonio*,’ Fiction,” 5.

environment while under the purview of the world community and bearing the responsibility of the future of sub-Saharan Africa. The Cuban intervention into Angola showed how ordinary people interacted with the violent wars of decolonization and subsequently, how their experiences shaped the colonized world during the twentieth century. Cuba's intervention, in which hundreds of thousands of people willingly fought in a civil war for a country on a different continent, demonstrated the power of internationalism in shaping the decisions made during decolonization. The motivations of most Cuban volunteers were primarily ideological, while the testimonials and new ideas that they brought back with them revealed decolonization as an age of cultural exchange and mutual understanding between peoples of the developing world.

The Impact of Anti-Jewish Legislation in Fascist Italy

By Isabella M. Fazio

In 1938, Benito Mussolini passed the first set of anti-Semitic laws in Fascist Italy that left both Jewish and Italian populations in a state of shock. Jews had mostly been assimilated into Italian culture by this time, leaving room for plenty of confusion. This racial campaign took place from 1938 to 1943, before the German occupation of Italy in July 1943. At first, discrimination was limited to Jewish banishment from attending or teaching in public schools. The discrimination escalated when Jews were prohibited from certain professions or from residing in Italy at all. Although, in most cases, Italian-Jewish citizenship was never revoked, the legislation severely limited their citizenship status.

Overall, Jews in Italy reacted in one of three ways: they felt betrayed by Mussolini and the state, they tried to rid themselves of their Jewishness, or they joined the Anti-Fascist Resistance.¹ Foreign Jews, the school system, and Jewish life at home were the areas that the laws predominantly targeted. By analyzing Fascist Italy's anti-Jewish legislation, specifically the racial laws, it can be determined exactly how Italian Jews were influenced by the passage of these laws and if the legislation was properly enforced.

¹ Bernard Dov Cooperman and Barbara Garvin, *The Jews of Italy Memory and Identity* (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 2008), 406.

“For the Defense of Race”

On November 11, 1938, *Il Duce* and King Victor Emmanuel III officially approved the “Laws for the Defense of Race” in Rome, and Mussolini adopted a non-race-based approach to the persecution of Jews in daily Italian life.² The blame for this discriminatory legislation falls entirely on Mussolini and other proponents of Italian Fascism. Many scholars agree that the passage of these laws was solely due to Mussolini’s desire to impress Hitler and express his gratitude for the solidarity between Germany and Italy. In general, anti-Semitism was foreign to most Italians, who had allowed Jews to gradually assimilate following their initial emancipation during the Napoleonic period.³ Italian Jews subsequently developed a strong sense of loyalty and love for the state, causing the passage of these laws to be even more mystifying.

The 1938 Italian laws were similar to Germany’s Nuremberg Laws; however, their intention and intensity were different than the Nazi Regime’s motivations. Mussolini informed the public that the goal of these laws was to “discriminate not to persecute,” as a *discriminazione* (Discrimination) status was created.⁴ A Jew with *discriminazione* status was one who had earned heightened status through military service, politics, business, or culture, meaning that they would be treated better than those without equal standing. Except for the inability to teach in schools, *discriminazione* Jews were not subject to the racial barriers imposed by the new laws.

² Cooperman and Garvin, *The Jews of Italy Memory and Identity*, 403; Joshua D. Zimmermann, *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule: 1922-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6.

³ Zimmermann, *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule: 1922-1945*, 6.

⁴ “The Defense of the Race in Italy” - An Article Published in an Italian Newspaper, August 1938,” Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies, https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%204673.pdf.

This special status, however, only applied to a narrow swath of society, forcing most Italian and foreign Jews to live under Mussolini's oppressive legislation.

These policies began by prohibiting intermarriages between "Aryans" and "Non-Aryans," banning Jews from military service and from being guardians of non-Jewish minors.⁵ Jews were no longer legally allowed to send their children to public or private Italian schools or be employed by any Italian school, ranging from kindergarten to university. All textbooks written by Jewish authors were removed from Italian schools.⁶ The laws also barred Jews from any state employment, managing or owning businesses with more than one hundred employees, and owning land that had taxable value of more than 5,000 lire.⁷ Jews could no longer own domestic servants of the Aryan race and Italian citizenship earned by Jews after 1919 was revoked. All foreign Jews, except those over 65 years of age or those married to Italian citizens, were ordered to leave the country within four months or they would be forced out.⁸

On June 29, 1939, the laws underwent an expansion which further limited Italian-Jewish citizenship and rights. The new laws targeted Jewish lawyers, architects, journalists, dentists, and engineers by banning Jews from skilled professions. Jews were no longer allowed to vacation in certain spots, own radios, place death notices in the newspaper, publish books, lecture publicly, have their names in telephone books, or enter certain public buildings. Jewish citizenship was never rescinded from Jews who had been citizens since before 1919. Foreign Jews were not subject to these laws but were instead interned in small villages and camps following

⁵ "Jews in Nazi-Occupied Italy: The Laws for the Defense of the Race, November 11, 1938," Jewish Virtual Library, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-laws-for-the-defense-of-the-race-in-italy>.

⁶ "Jews in Nazi-Occupied Italy: The Laws for the Defense of the Race."

⁷ Zimmermann, *Jews in Italy under Fascist and Nazi Rule: 1922-1945*, 3.

⁸ Zimmermann, 3.

Italy's delayed entry into World War II. These discriminatory laws were designed to further Mussolini's goal of ridding Italy of its Jewish population.⁹

Jewish and Italian Reactions

Many Jews refused to believe that Mussolini would ever want them to be seen as anything less than Italian. Before 1938, Mussolini had made pro-Zionist statements and met with Zionist leaders.¹⁰ There were even Jewish Fascists who helped found the Italian Fascist Party and vigorously supported *Il Duce* and the Italian state.¹¹ Jews wrote pleading letters to Mussolini and King Victor Emmanuel III asking to become *discriminazione* or to be considered Aryan. These Jews saw themselves as *Italianissimi*, or "very Italian," where their extreme loyalty to Italy included unwavering praise of Fascism and dedication to the state.¹²

Jewish media and leaders encouraged Jews that this discrimination was temporary and that the sole purpose was for Mussolini to expedite and strengthen an alliance with Hitler.¹³ The Italian-Jewish newspaper *Israele* spread this message and persuaded Italian Jews to accept persecution in a "Fascist Spirit," causing many Jews to feel a greater loyalty toward Italy than

⁹ Zimmermann, 3; Leo Diamantstein, "Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl, *Oral History*, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, October 3, 1991, video, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn505518>.

¹⁰ Claire Shavick Hertzwig and Ronnee Berger, *From Equality to Survival: The Jewish Experience in Italy* (New York: City University of New York, 1993), 9.

¹¹ Daniel Tilles, *Fascism and the Jews: Italy and Britain* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2011), 162.

¹² Iael Nidam-Orvieto, "The Impact of Anti-Jewish Legislation on Everyday Life and the Response of Italian Jews, 1938-1943," in *Jews in Italy Under Fascist and Nazi Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 170.

¹³ Meir Michaelis, *Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy, 1922-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1978), 56.

Israel.¹⁴ Jews that had the resources emigrated to the Americas or Palestine, acquired false documents, or activated informal ties with non-Jewish Italian friends and officials in an attempt to cheat the laws.¹⁵ Others were forced to accept the laws and reorganize household incomes due to the loss of jobs, leading many to convert to Catholicism and renounce their Jewishness. The discrimination they faced caused Italian Jews to feel betrayed by the state they once saw as their home.¹⁶

Most literature written about Jews in Italy during this time highlighted the exceptional treatment of Jews compared to Jews in other countries who were forced to live in ghettos and wear the infamous yellow star. While there was some truth in this characterization, it overlooked the fact that Jews in Italy *were* actively persecuted, albeit to a lesser degree than in other European countries. The effects of the legislation, while subtler than those of other countries throughout Europe, were palpable. Many Italians severed friendships with Jews in fear of persecution or public humiliation and judgment. Anti-Jewish propaganda, supported by the Racial Office's sponsored radio conversations called "Judaism Against Rome," was spread, books were published with titles such as *The Jewish Problem*, and newspapers focused on subjects like "Are We Losing the War on Jews?"¹⁷ Shopkeepers and restaurant owners began voluntarily displaying signs that read, "Jews are not welcome" or "This store is Aryan." Italian businesses exposed their Jewish competitors for personal gain. In public, many Jews faced violence and were beaten if their status was exposed. At the same time, there were also many Italians who

¹⁴ Renzo de Felice, Franklin Hugh Adler, and Robert L. Miller, *The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History* (New York: Enigma Books, 2015), 331.

¹⁵ Cooperman and Garvin, *The Jews of Italy Memory and Identity*, 405.

¹⁶ Cooperman and Garvin, 404.

¹⁷ Sira Klein, *Italy's Jews from Emancipation to Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018),

ignored the racial laws and helped their Jewish counterparts escape persecution or simply did not care enough to enforce them. Overall, Jews in Italy did not face the same type of persecution as Jews in countries like Germany and Poland, but the discrimination they endured was nonetheless significant.¹⁸

Foreign Jews and Internment

Despite the implementation of anti-Semitic laws on Italian soil, the state continued to assist refugees. Between the years 1938 and 1941, 3,000 Jews escaped Germany and entered Italy. Dante Almansi, president of *Unione delle Comunita Israeliche Italiana* (Union of Italian Jewish Communities), was granted permission by the Italian government in 1939 to create *Delegazione per l'Assistenza Emigranti Ebrei* (Delegation for the Assistance of Jewish Immigrants), an organization that would help Jewish refugees who arrived from other parts of Europe.¹⁹ This organization saved the lives of over 5,000 Jews by helping them escape to neutral countries.²⁰ Moreover, when 800 Jewish refugees were stranded on a boat in the Mediterranean Sea without any food or set destination, it was an Italian ship that came to their rescue.²¹

Mussolini's racial laws stated that foreign Jews who lacked Italian citizenship or earned it after 1919 would be expelled from the country or placed in internment camps. One such individual was Leo Diamantstein, a German Jew who moved to Milan in 1933 with his family. When arrested, he described the Italian guards as "apologetic" and "simply fulfilling an order." He remembered seeing no difference between himself and his other Italian friends: "We just couldn't

¹⁸ Klein, *Italy's Jews from Emancipation to Freedom*, 102.

¹⁹ "Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl.

²⁰ Daniel Tilles, *Fascism and the Jews: Italy and Britain*, 162.

²¹ "Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl.

believe it, we had so many Italian friends and we saw them just like us, and they couldn't believe it either." Diamantstein spent his time in the Terre Monte Internment Camp where the "Italian guards never mistreated us" but conditions were far from superb. He described the culture of the camp; there was a soccer team, orchestra, and even access to radios. Diamantstein's testimony showed that while Italian officials arrested foreign Jews who were residing in the country illegally, Italian internment camps were designed to keep them in one central location rather than to exterminate them. ²²

The Terre Monte Camp eventually became too full for Diamantstein and his family as the Italian government continued to accept Jewish refugees. The family moved to the nearby town of Arcearo, and Diamanstein's father was able to start a business. Once, when Diamanstein traveled to Milan to purchase equipment for the family business, a Milanese official stopped him to check his documents. Diamenstein only had a subscription for the Milano Convoy System in his possession, which the official informed him was not enough to establish citizenship. Diamenstein thanked him, and the officer simply let him go. Evidently, even Italian officials were not strictly enforcing the rules. ²³

The Jewish-Italian Teacher and Student

The discriminatory laws impacted the daily lives of Italian Jews, particularly in regard to education. One of the first measures that Mussolini passed was to rid the school system of Jews and their published works. Nearly 5,600 Jewish students in Italy were forbidden from attending

²²"Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl.

²³"Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl.

school.²⁴ The classroom was one of the first places targeted because its environment was intended to foster the next generation of Fascists.²⁵ While the policy was meant to prohibit Jews from attending Italian schools and universities, some Jews found a way around this rule.

Mayer Relles was a Polish Jew that began attending Rabbinical College in Rome in 1933. Relles described how students who, like himself, had been residing in Rome before the laws were passed could stay in Italy. Relles was able to come to Italy and study for free because Mussolini had encouraged foreigners to study at Italian universities. The only change that occurred for foreign Jewish university students, after the passage of the laws, was that tuition was no longer be free. Instead, they had to pay tuition at half price. All foreign students were able to finish their studies in Italy—except for German Jews, who were asked to leave. Unfortunately for Relles, there was a mix-up with his registration documents that proved he was a student. Despite the mix-up, a university professor was able to forge documents for Relles, allowing him to stay in Rome until the German occupation of Italy.²⁶

Not every Jew in the Italian education system was as lucky as Relles. Aldo Neppi Modona described his struggles as a Jewish university professor after the racial laws were passed. In 1932, Neppi Modona joined the Roman Chapter of the Fascist Party along with his Jewish and non-Jewish colleagues because if Italian citizens wanted to continue their careers, then they needed to become official members of the Fascist Party.²⁷ Despite Neppi Modona's

²⁴ Felice, Adler, and Miller, *The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History*, 332.

²⁵ Nidam-Orvieto, "The Impact of Anti-Jewish Legislation on Everyday Life and the Response of Italian Jews, 1938-1943," 162.

²⁶ "Oral History Interview with Mayer Relles," interview by Ellen Rofman, *Oral History*, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, June 27, 1983, video, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn515644>.

²⁷ Kate Cohen, Aldo Neppi Modona, and Leo Neppi Modona, *The Neppi Modona Diaries: Reading Jewish Survival through My Italian Family* (Hanover: Dartmouth College, 1997), 16.

discriminazione status, he was forced to stop teaching after the laws came into effect. Rachel Neppi Modona, Aldo's wife, remembered professors converting to Catholicism and calling themselves Aryan in an attempt to save their jobs.²⁸ Aldo and Rachel's children were no longer allowed to attend Italian public schools and were forced to stay home, since the Jewish school was too far away. The Neppi Modona family decided that Rome was becoming too unsafe and moved to Galluzzo, a town outside of Florence. An Italian professor knew that Aldo was unable to work, so he hired Aldo to write articles for the *Enciclopedia Treccani*. The Neppi Modona children were homeschooled, but the state allowed them to take the required exams that would allow them to move on to the next grade level. While the conditions of the classrooms where Jewish students took their exams were poor, as far as the state was concerned, Jewish children were allowed to move onto the next level of schooling.²⁹

Though Relles and the Neppi Modona family did not share the same experiences when dealing with the Italian school system, both of their stories exhibited the mild leniency that the Italian government sometimes exercised when dealing with Jews. University students were given permission to continue their studies, and even students like Relles proved that there were ways to evade the system. Circumstances were more difficult for families like the Neppi Modonas, who were forced to abide by the laws almost entirely, however, they took advantage of the opportunities the state gave Jewish students while Aldo secretly worked for a professor. Although the racial laws were enforced, there were several loopholes that Jewish professors and students exploited in order to circumvent the law.

²⁸ Cohen, A. Neppi Modona, and L. Neppi Modona, *The Neppi Modona Diaries: Reading Jewish Survival through My Italian Family*, 53.

²⁹ Cohen, A. Neppi Modona, and L. Neppi Modona, 60.

Life in the Jewish Home

The Neppi Modona family also experienced change within the dynamic of their home. The racial laws prohibited Jews from hiring Aryan help, which the family had had at the time of the laws' enactment. Rachel remembered the "brusque" impact that the forced removal of their cook, maid, and nanny had on the family while they lived in Rome.³⁰ Once they moved outside of Florence, the family was given permission from the police to have maids, mostly because the laws were not as seriously implemented in the countryside as they were in bigger cities like Rome. The police even said to the family, "You see, we are better here in Florence."³¹

Likewise, Leo Diamanstein recalled the struggles that his family faced while searching for a place to live in Italy. Leo and his family were foreign Jews, so they were greater targets than those who had been citizens since before 1919. Nonetheless, Diamanstein never experienced discrimination from his Italian friends, nor did he feel as if the laws had a significant impact on the attitudes of the general public. He claimed that his family struggled to find a place to rent not because landlords were concerned about following the law, but because they felt that the family's stay would be temporary. He found that the racial laws were "never really enforced," and his family used their connections to stay with Italian friends until they were arrested and brought to the internment camps.³²

Primo Levi, a Jewish chemistry student, was able to finish his studies because his professor assisted him in forging documents. His father, however, was no longer permitted to work as a chemist for the state, leaving him unemployed and with only a small pension. Many

³⁰ Cohen, A. Neppi Modona, and L. Neppi Modona, 56.

³¹ Cohen, A. Neppi Modona, and L. Neppi Modona, 78.

³² "Oral History Interview with Leo Diamantstein," interview by Beverly Stahl.

Jewish families suffered from unemployment as the new racial laws prohibited any Jews, many of them professionals, from working for the state.³³ Thus, his family decided to move to the mountains, where Levi joined the anti-Fascist movement that was growing in Northern Italy. When caught by Fascists, Levi was forced to admit he was a Jew, since admitting being a partisan would have guaranteed his death. He was then sent to an internment camp where he stayed until German occupation.³⁴ Levi's story demonstrated how the passage of these laws was not completely detrimental to the life plans of most Jews, however, few Jewish families remained unaffected.

Conclusion

Compared to the treatment of Jews in the rest of Europe, Jews in Italy experienced less discrimination and infringement on their rights. Nevertheless, centuries of Jewish assimilation in Italy was interrupted, and a large portion of Italian society was affected. Although most Italian Jews survived World War II, Jewish life in many communities throughout the country practically disappeared. By the time Germany occupied Italy in 1943, Mussolini and his regime had laid much of the groundwork for the Nazis due to their implementation of discriminatory legislation. As evidenced by the experiences of several first-hand witnesses, however, the overall application of the laws was inconsistent. Many cases showed that there were various opportunities for Jews to forge paperwork or use their connections with Aryan Italians to circumvent the law. Even Italian officials often failed to enforce the laws or did so halfheartedly. Many Jews did not feel

³³ Cooperman and Garvin, *The Jews of Italy Memory and Identity*, 403.

³⁴ Primo Levi, "Oral History Interview with Primo Levi," interview, *Oral History*, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1972, <https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/irn510176>.

that their Italian neighbors treated them differently, and some Italians even broke the law to help their Jewish neighbors evade the authorities. In other cases, Italian Jews faced discrimination and had to adhere to the laws completely, but these stories are far less common.

Future scholarship on this topic should avoid the dichotomy of across-the-board discrimination or outright leniency towards Italian Jews during this period; no Jew's experience fits neatly into either box. Rather, most Italian Jews found sympathy in their communities while simultaneously enduring certain discriminatory practices in everyday life. Variables, such as geographic location, further colored an individual's experience. Therefore, the Jewish experience in Italy during this period should be studied with every potential factor in mind—a family's location within Italy, the Aryan connections they had, or the occupation held by the head of the household—since most Italian Jews experienced some measure of discrimination while simultaneously encountering kindness and sympathy.

Nixon's Trip to China and Soviet Influence in East Asia

By Ryan Nassar

On January 1, 1979, the United States officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a legitimate governing body, an act which would have been unthinkable a decade prior.¹ This act of diplomacy would have been difficult to imagine just a few years earlier as the Cold War continued to perpetuate the sharp division between East and West. Yet, as the twentieth century wore on, diplomatic alliances shifted—and Sino-US relations were no exception. The United States' groundbreaking recognition of China marked the culmination of more than a decade of negotiations between American and Chinese diplomats as well as a fundamental shift in the balance of power during the Cold War.

As the 1960s wore on amid decades of proxy wars and nuclear buildup, relations between the Soviet Union and United States seemed unlikely to thaw. In the years leading up to 1969, the two nations' icy relationship was exacerbated by several important developments in the international system. Among them was the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons—the main catalyst for the Cuban Missile Crisis—as well as the acceleration of the space race and increasing tensions in Vietnam and the rest of South East Asia. Amid these developments, the People's Republic of China stood as a point of contention in American international policy.²

¹“China Policy,” U.S. Department of State, accessed August 10, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy>.

²“Cold War History,” History.com, last modified May 15, 2019, <https://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history>.

While China's Communist leader, Mao Zedong, had removed the nationalist party decades earlier and established a Marxist-style government in its place, the party still faced ideological and territorial disputes with the Soviet Union. In addition to poor relations with the Soviet Union, the PRC maintained tense relations with the United States, amplified by clashes between American and Chinese troops during the Korean and Vietnam wars and the United States' continued refusal to recognize the PRC as China's legitimate government. The PRC was in a tough spot; its relations with the two super powers of the Cold War had deteriorated to the point of violent military incidents, and something needed to be done. Taking advantage of communist China's growing conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States sought to improve its relations with the PRC government.³

Many academics have examined this pivotal point in history and the impact it had on the world, however, most choose to examine this major diplomatic event solely from the facts that were presented at the time. If scholars did analyze previously confidential documents, they failed to compare them with public documents released at the same time. For example, in his article "Review: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, 1969-1972," Geoffrey Warner examined why the Nixon administration chose to improve relations with China, yet most of his analysis was based on facts that were already presented to the public, rather than on any private communications or documents.⁴ Meanwhile, in "The 'Propaganda State' and Sino-American Rapprochement: Preparing the Chinese Public for Nixon's Visit," Guolin Yi included

³"Cold War History."

⁴ Geoffrey Warner, "Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China, 1969-1972," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 83, no. 4 (2007): 763.

confidential information, such as discussions among Chinese officials, to compare the Chinese public responses to the US with their internal communications.⁵ Finally, Michelle Murray Yang discussed in “President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts During His 1972 Trip to China: A Study in Diplomatic Rhetoric” how Nixon’s rhetoric in his public speeches highlighted the goals of his mission while in China. Much like Warner and Yi, Yang’s article lacked significant examination of the internal communications present before, during, and after the talks.⁶ Therefore, it is imperative that this time period is examined through a lens that many scholars have neglected to consider or explore.

The Beginning of Rapprochement With the PRC

Between 1969 and 1972, relations between the United States and PRC warmed dramatically due to the lifting of sanctions and travel bans as well as President Richard Nixon’s trip to the country in the early 1970s. Nixon’s trip, a momentous event, was shaped by the meetings and events of the previous three years. While many actions by the US government were kept secret during the Cold War, the development of the negotiations with China were relatively well publicized over time. Throughout the US-China dialogue, the United States deliberately released classified information that strengthened their negotiating position or increased public support for the administration’s actions while withholding information that weakened their diplomatic position or undermined public support for negotiations. This strategy was decidedly

⁵ Guolin Yi, “The “Propaganda State” and Sino-American Rapprochement: Preparing the Chinese Public for Nixon’s Visit,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 20, no. 1 (2013): 5.

⁶ Michelle Murray Yang, “President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts during His 1972 Trip to China: A Study in Diplomatic Rhetoric,” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2011): 1.

effective, as the prospect of a US-China alliance frightened the Soviets and pushed them to sign deals with the United States.

Beginning in 1969, President Nixon thought about strategies on how the US could improve its relations with China. A memorandum from Nixon to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on February 1, 1969 illustrated Nixon's thought process. In the memorandum, Nixon stated that while he wanted to start "exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese," the mission should be conducted in secret. Kissinger responded that US diplomats would float the possibility by the Chinese during the February 20 talks in Warsaw.⁷ Kissinger also told Nixon that he instructed the ambassador to show a "willingness to enter into serious negotiations with Peking, make proposals on scientific exchanges, and invite specific proposals from the Chinese."⁸ Unfortunately, this meeting did not occur due to an increase in fighting between the Chinese and Soviets, making the Chinese reluctant to further anger the Soviets.⁹ The unreleased memo shows a willingness by the Nixon administration to conduct formal talks with the Chinese three years before Nixon set foot on Chinese soil. In order to safeguard American prestige and ensure maximum public support, the goal of improved relations with China was kept classified until tangible progress had been made.

⁷ Richard Nixon, "Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," 1 February 1969, Document 3 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

⁸ Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon," 12 February 1969, Document 6 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Soviet Thinking About the Danger of a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement*, ESAU LI, Washington, DC: GPO, 1971, accessed August 10, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/esau-50.pdf>.

Public Knowledge of Security Studies on the PRC

The improvement of relations between the US and China was not necessarily due to fear surrounding the development of the Chinese nuclear weapons programs. On February 27, 1969, a National Security Estimate was conducted to assess the Chinese strategic weapons program. It was found that, while the development of nuclear weapons was given high priority, the Chinese still needed more facilities and recourses to make rapid progress towards complex modern weapons.¹⁰ The report explained that the Chinese would, if they had not already, realize that they could not compete with the superpowers, and would instead attempt to garner prestige by launching a satellite into space.¹¹ Evidently, at this point in time, there was little concern in the intelligence community about a Chinese nuclear strike, meaning that the fear of a Chinese nuclear attack would not have played a significant role in Nixon's decision to develop better relations. Nevertheless, since the general public was still largely in the dark, American attempts to improve relations were generally thought to be motivated by fears of a Chinese nuclear attack.

The classified information in the Estimate was soon made public to dispel the notion that America was afraid of China. After the Chinese sent a satellite into space in 1970, an article in *Science News* discussed the meaning of the launch, which was similar to the context given by the US government. The article reassured its readers, stating that the satellite was primitive and would not be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.¹² The article quotes Secretary of Defense

¹⁰ National Security Estimates (NSE's) are the Intelligence Community's authoritative written judgement on national security issues; National Security Council, "National Intelligence Estimate," 27 February 1969, Document 7 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

¹¹ National Security Council, "National Intelligence Estimate," 27 February 1969.

¹² "China Joins the Space Age," *Science News* 97, no. 18 (1970): 427.

Melvin R. Laird as saying “if the earliest IOC [initial operating capability] were achieved, the number of operational launchers might fall somewhere between 10 and 25 in 1975.”¹³ This assessment was pulled straight from the 1969 National Security Estimate, demonstrating how the US government had willingly allowed information about China to become public, particularly to ease public fear of a Chinese nuclear attack. Clearly, the US wanted to make it known that any future rapprochement would not be due to fear of Chinese development of nuclear weapons, but out of a desire for cooperation. By controlling the release of information to the public, the US improved its position in future negotiations with China.

Evolving Sino-Soviet Relationship and the United States’ Response

By the end of 1969, several developments occurred in East Asia that altered the course of US talks with China. A small conflict broke out between Soviet and Chinese troops over the Ussuri River in August 1969. On August 12, 1969, a National Intelligence Estimate found that, due to the conflict, Sino-Soviet relations were showing few signs of improving over the next three years and China saw the Soviets as their most immediate threat.¹⁴ The estimate also stated that the Soviets were not looking for a prolonged battle with the Chinese, and were therefore unlikely to launch an attack.¹⁵ As these events unfolded, the public was fairly well-informed and shared many of the same views as the US government. In a 1969 *Russian Review* article, Peter Tang

¹³ “China Joins the Space Age,” 428.

¹⁴ National Security Council, “National Intelligence Estimate,” 12 August 1969, Document 24 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

¹⁵ National Security Council, “National Intelligence Estimate,” 12 August 1969.

discussed the presence of a fundamental and ideological divide between the two states.¹⁶ Tang's analysis paralleled the National Intelligence Estimate's analysis, in which the NSC stated that China considered the Soviet Union to be their greatest immediate threat. Tang further contended that the Chinese did not anticipate a Soviet attack because the Soviets would want to avoid opening a second front—a view concurrent with the estimate that was conducted immediately following the conflict's onset.¹⁷ While readily publicized knowledge was valuable, the confidential information that was deliberately provided to the public by the United States government led to more support for future US diplomatic actions in China.

Shortly after the Sino-Soviet conflict began, Nixon approached the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, to discuss possible communication with the Chinese. According to a memorandum of the conversation, Yahya Khan believed that the Chinese felt surrounded by enemies and they should be brought into a dialogue with other nations.¹⁸ Nixon replied that he did not see Asia moving forward without an "open" China.¹⁹ At the time, Nixon recognized the rift between the Soviet Union and China and saw the conflict as an opportunity for the US to become diplomatically closer to China. Some within the Nixon administration also saw these meetings as a way of meddling in Chinese Soviet affairs. In a memorandum from Secretary of State William Rogers to President Nixon, Rogers concluded: "Our moves may introduce an additional complicating factor into the Soviet leadership's assessment of our intentions towards China..."

¹⁶ Peter S. H. Tang, "Sino-Soviet Territorial Disputes: Past and Present," *The Russian Review* 28, no. 4 (1969): 408.

¹⁷ Tang, "Sino-Soviet Territorial Disputes: Past and Present."

¹⁸ National Security Council, "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 August 1969, Document 28 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

¹⁹ National Security Council, "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 August 1969.

Such an effect would also serve our long-term interests of forestalling an eventual more fundamental rapprochement between the USSR and China.”²⁰ Rogers’s analysis illustrated how the objectives of the discussions were to weaken Soviet influence in the region by preventing a reparation of relations between the Soviet and Chinese.

Information Withheld from the Public

In a memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a staff member to the National Security Council, to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Sonnenfeldt captured the importance of secrecy. He proposed the US not inform the Soviets on the subject of the US-Chinese negotiations in order to cause further distress to the Soviets.²¹ Nixon told Kissinger that, if he should say anything about these meetings, to be “noncommittal in comments,” even though Nixon had made several suggestions in previous months about what he wished to discuss with the Chinese, such as permitting exports from China into the US and allowing travel to China.²² The efficacy of Nixon’s information policy is evidenced in a *New York Times* article from September 6, 1969, in which Under Secretary of State Richardson mentioned that the US

²⁰ William Rogers, “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon,” 2 December 1969, Document 49 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

²¹ Helmut Sonnenfeldt, “Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” 11 December 1969, Document 51 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

²² National Security Council, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 9 September 1969, Document 31 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office); John Richardson, “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Document 19 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

wanted to improve relations with China to meet its “changing needs” and that Soviet concerns would not prevent the meetings from happening.²³ Since the Soviets did not receive any information about the negotiations with the Chinese—even the American public and media could not provide any clues—they were most likely wary of further dealings with the Chinese. By deliberately withholding information about the content of these discussions from the public, the United States was able to maintain a positive public atmosphere surrounding the talks while also undermining Sino-Soviet relations.

The Beginning of Formal Meetings with the PRC

After the US began backdoor conversations with China, the first formal meeting between Chinese and American diplomats occurred on January 20, 1970. In a memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon on January 12, Kissinger stated that the Chinese wanted the meeting to be public so that China could “show the appearance of an ability to deal with [the US] – primarily for Soviet consumption.”²⁴ Clearly, the Chinese also hoped the meetings would elicit a Soviet response to the potential for Chinese and US cooperation. On January 14, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memorandum to Nixon outlining what the ambassador should discuss during the meeting. He stressed that the ambassador should discuss the United States’ plans to reduce military personnel in Southeast Asia, issues concerning trade and arms control, and

²³ Henry Raymont, “Nixon Aide Affirms U.S. Will Press For China Ties: Nixon Aide Affirms Goal of Better Tie With China,” *New York Times* (1923-Current file), September 6, 1969.

²⁴ Henry Kissinger, “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon,” 12 January 1970, Document 59 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

clearly state that US personnel would be willing to go to China.²⁵ Rogers's memo displayed a clear willingness by the US government to scale back military operations in Vietnam in order to reduce the tension in the region. At this time, however, the public had very limited knowledge about the American proposal to lower troop levels in the region. In April of 1970, shortly after the meeting, G. P. Deshpande wrote an *Economic and Political Weekly* article stating that an American withdrawal of troops from the region was nowhere in sight; in fact, the US had not even considered a withdrawal.²⁶ This article highlighted the discrepancy between public knowledge and reality, since the ambassador was instructed to discuss troop reductions in Southeast Asia with the Chinese. The US government withheld information regarding a potential decrease in troops to avoid appearing vulnerable to the Soviets, who may have decided to attack if they knew that there would be fewer US military personnel in the region.

Nixon's Visit to China

Throughout the US-Chinese discussions, the issue of the Vietnam War was omnipresent. Leading up to Nixon's trip to China in January of 1972, the US government sent a message to the Chinese government stating that it had done everything it could to negotiate with the North Vietnamese and would respond to any attacks by the North Vietnamese.²⁷ The Chinese refuted

²⁵ William Rogers, "Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon," 14 January 1970, Document 61 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

²⁶ G. P. Deshpande, "China's Foreign Policy in the Seventies," *Economic and Political Weekly* 5, no. 16 (1970): 678.

²⁷ Government of the United States, "Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the PRC," 24 January 1972, Document 186 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

the United States' belief, arguing that the US had not done as much as it could have and that the North Vietnamese had every right to retaliate against the US. They even declared that "the Chinese people will not flinch from even the greatest national sacrifices in giving resolute support to the Vietnamese people."²⁸ While this could have been rhetoric from the Chinese, their history of support for the North Vietnamese suggested that they would be true to their promise. The general public did not seem to know about the dispute between the US and China. An article published around this time, in *The Journal of Peace Research*, argued that the talks and Nixon's visit would likely force the Chinese to accept any deal offered by the US, since "Peking certainly judges its interests much more important than the national aspirations of the Vietnamese."²⁹ Thus, the article's assertion refuted any possibility of reservations from the Chinese while also contributing to the allusion of a unified, Sino-American effort in East and Southeast Asia.

Once Richard Nixon traveled to China and met with Mao Zedong, the pair discussed several of the issues brought up in past communications and meetings. Nixon and Prime Minister Chou Enlai released a joint statement, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué, which stated that "progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interest of all countries," and reflected their common yearning for bilateral trade deals and the need to stay in contact through various formal channels.³⁰ While solidifying Sino-

²⁸ Vernon A. Walters, "Memorandum From the Defense Attaché in France (Walters) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)," 30 January 1972, Document 187 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

²⁹ Marek Thee, "U.S.- Chinese Rapprochement and Vietnam," *Journal of Peace Research* 9, no. 1 (1972): 65.

³⁰ Richard Nixon, Chou Enlai, "Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People's Republic of China," 27 February 1972, Document 203 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

American relations, this joint statement also invited Soviet criticism. Prime Minister Chou later told the US government that Soviet slander was unlikely to cease anytime soon, further demonstrating how the Soviets were troubled by the newfound cooperation between China and the US.³¹ Following Nixon's visit, Soviet fears became a reality. In an *Economic and Political Weekly* article in 1972, Deshpande discussed how the US followed the Chinese lead during the Indo-Pakistan conflict and supported Pakistan, while the Soviet Union supported India.³² The United States' public support for some of China's foreign policy decisions only added to the anxiety of the Soviet Union.

In preparation for Nixon's trip to Moscow in 1972, Kissinger relayed some points that he had discussed with the Russian ambassador in a memorandum to the President. Kissinger reaffirmed the importance that the United States placed on its relationship with the PRC, and that he would not sign any agreements that would go against their shared interests.³³ These policies showed how the US and PRC had developed, and were striving to maintain, relatively close ties in the short time following Nixon's visit. Additionally, both nations mutually benefitted from their friendly relations in their discussions with the Soviet Union. Even the public was aware of the Soviets' unfavorable position, as evidenced by an article in *The Russian Review* which claimed that the Soviets would accept any deal that was offered by the Americans out of

³¹ National Security Council, "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 February 1972, Document 204 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

³² G. P. Deshpande, "A Week That Did Not Quite Change the World," *Economic and Political Weekly* 7, no. 10 (1972): 533.

³³ Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon," Document 227 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1972, VOLUME XVII, China, 1969-1972*, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian (Washington: Government Printing Office).

fear of American and Chinese cooperation.³⁴ Given the significant public knowledge of Sino-American relations, the increased publicity certainly put pressure on the Soviet Union to cooperate with the US, as many in the region began to question their strength and influence in East Asia.

Conclusion

While the United States withheld some information about Nixon's trip to China, it allowed much of the information to be disseminated to the public to increase support for Nixon's visit and put pressure on the Soviet Union. This ultimately successful strategy required the strict management of the flow of information while cultivating public support at home and abroad. Throughout the Cold War, a significant amount of information regarding US overseas operations were kept secret to prevent public criticism and to avoid Soviet intelligence gathering on US plans and goals. Nixon's trip to China, however, and the US government-controlled release of information showed how the manipulation of information was advantageous to the United States' position in international diplomacy. By selectively releasing American intelligence, the US exhibited a position of strength to its citizens and the USSR, thereby further pressuring the Soviets to comply with Russo-American diplomatic talks, such as the SALT accords. This pressure played an important role in the relaxation of tensions between the US and USSR during the 1970s—a time period that would later be known as *Détente*.

³⁴ Robert G. Wesson, "The Soviet-American Arms Limitation Agreement," *The Russian Review* 31, no. 4 (1972): 341.

The new Sino-American cooperation was eventually finalized under President Jimmy Carter in 1979, when the United States formally recognized the PRC government and officially opened relations. The tactics employed by the United States government during these negotiations exemplified how government-controlled release of information can be vital to the realization of national goals. While concealing information can be beneficial by not allowing the enemy to gain an advantage, strategically releasing information can also demonstrate power and unity when placing pressure on the opposing side. By carefully controlling what information was released to the public, the United States managed to overcome decades of conflict with China fundamentally alter the balance of power during the Cold War.

The Connecticut River Communities and King Philip's War

By Yusuf Mansoor

The River Communities were a string of loosely connected Native Americans who lived along the lower Connecticut River both before and during the colonial period.¹ Their collective relationship with English colonists evolved tremendously over the fifty-year period between their first encounter with Massachusetts settlers to the conclusion of King Philip's War. In short, they went from calling for further colonial settlement to, in part, being at war with those same colonies. This transition was largely due to the rapid expansion of colonial lands which resulted in continued encroachment on Native lands. Another cause of the transition was the diplomatic and military efforts of other Native tribes, most notably the Mohegans. Uncas, leader of the Mohegans, used his alliance with Connecticut to expand his own influence in the wake of the Pequot War.² This expanded influence led to several clashes with the other tribes of Southern New England, such as Miantonomo's Narragansetts in the early 1640s.³ Uncas's actions against the River Communities, supported by Connecticut Colony, also targeted the River Indians and prompted them to forge alliances with the Pocumtucks and the Narragansetts, who later proved to be instrumental members of the anticolonial alliance during King Philip's War.⁴ Although a

¹ Michael Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 19.

² Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 63-86.

³ Oberg, 87-110.

⁴ Katherine A. Grandjean, "The Long Wake of the Pequot War," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 9, no. 2 (2011), 399; Eric Spencer Johnson, "Political Strategies among Native Americans of Seventeenth Century Southern New England" (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts, 1993), 399.

majority of the River Indians did not fight the colonists, their inter-tribal alliances, along with their fraught history, led some to war with the colony.⁵

The term “River Tribe” was a colonial construction, coined by Puritan historian William Hubbard.⁶ Alfred Cave suggested that these groups could be better described as “bands, loosely related to one another through intermarriage and allied politically in loose and transitory alliances among village sachems.”⁷ Michael Oberg offered a similar definition when writing about one such tribe, the Podunks: “The Podunks likely were a polyglot community composed of individuals and kin groups with ties to several villages.”⁸ There were some sachems, or leaders, of these tribes, but they controlled far smaller regions than leaders like Uncas and Miantonomo, who led the Mohegans and Narragansetts respectively.⁹ The River Indians, however, were not isolated from the lands beyond the Connecticut River Valley. They were connected to groups like the Mohegans through both economic and familial ties.¹⁰ The compact communities on the Connecticut were far more closely connected to each other, though they were by no means consistent allies; despite their close bonds, there were several instances of fights and killings among them. Therefore, “river communities” might be a more apt term than “River tribes,” as it implies a cohesion that was absent among these polities at the time.

⁵ Jason W. Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed: Victory in the Great Narragansett War, 1675-1676* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 175.

⁶ Alfred Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 38.

⁷ Cave, *The Pequot War*, 38.

⁸ Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 19.

⁹ John W. De Forest, *History of the Indians of Connecticut* (Hamden: Shoestring Press, 1964), 54.

¹⁰ J. Hammond Trumbull ed., *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, Volume 2* (Hartford: F.A. Brown, 1852), 471.

The lower Connecticut River Valley was especially significant in the Northeast because of these loose political structures. Many Native powers beyond the Connecticut attempted to secure this region, and conflicts that occurred on the lower Connecticut frequently spiraled into regional conflicts because of the alliances River Indians had with groups like the Mohegans, Narragansetts, and Pocumtucks. A Wangunk and Pequot raid on the town of Wethersfield in 1637 led, in part, to an escalation of the Pequot War that included the Mystic Fort Massacre.¹¹ After the Pequot War, the key Native rivalry in this region was between the Mohegans, located roughly in Eastern Connecticut, and the Narragansetts, in Western Rhode Island. An attack on Uncas by a River Indian ally of the Narragansetts, and Uncas's retribution, began another regional conflict in 1643, which cost the Narragansett sachem, Miantonomo, his life.¹²

King Philip's War on the Lower Connecticut

A vast number of scholarly sources on King Philip's War do not mention the river communities at all. This omission is understandable, as several of the other indigenous peoples involved were far more prominent and numerous, causing more damage to colonial settlements than the river communities were likely capable of. Historians that have addressed the River Indians give conflicting narratives from one book to the next. Warren, an expert on Connecticut's role in King Philip's War, wrote that "Connecticut's Indians almost exclusively avoided supporting the hostile coalition...the Connecticut River Indians, the Tunxis of the Farmington River Valley and the scattered peoples of west and southwestern Connecticut, also chose largely

¹¹ The Mystic Fort Massacre resulted in the slaughter of around 500 Pequots, largely women and children, by an alliance of New England colonies, Mohegans, and Narragansetts; Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 58.

¹² Oberg, 143.

to support the colonists or remain neutral.”¹³ De Forest, on the other hand, wrote that, aside from the Pequots and Mohegans “The other tribes of Connecticut mostly remained neutral, except a few of the Nipmucks...and also the Podunks of East Windsor and East Hartford.”¹⁴ The exception of the Podunks, one of the river communities, is the key difference between these two sources. The disagreement over Podunk involvement is largely due to confusions of the primary sources that came from the Connecticut War Council.

The first evidence of the River Indians’ involvement in King Philip’s War comes from a note from Uncas, not long after the first hostilities when Wampanoag warriors forced colonists to abandon the town of Swansea in late June 1675.¹⁵ On July 10, Hartford received a letter from James Fitch, an English colonist who Connecticut Colony used to communicate with several important Indians, including Uncas and Robin Cassacinamon, a Pequot leader. After reassuring Hartford that both the Mohegans and the Pequots remained allies with the colonists, Fitch mentioned that “Unkus saith you have many Narragansetts living some at Potunk and some at Hokkanum and they will prove false to you.”¹⁶ Both towns were Podunk settlements. Whether Narragansetts were actually with the Podunks is uncertain, since Uncas had “eagerly exploited English suspicions as a weapon against his rivals” in the past.¹⁷ Perhaps he was doing so in this case as well, in an attempt to incriminate the Narragansetts and force the river communities to seek his protection from the Narragansetts. According to Douglas Leach, the Narragansetts

¹³ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 175.

¹⁴ De Forest, *History of the Indians of Connecticut*, 280.

¹⁵ Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip’s War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), 36.

¹⁶ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 336.

¹⁷ Grandjean, “The Long Wake of the Pequot War,” 402.

were circulating similar rumors about Uncas.¹⁸ While Uncas's note raised some questions about a potential Podunk-Narragansett alliance, it does not provide conclusive evidence. Colonists across New England, however, took drastic precautions to head off any potential threats from the Indians of the region. In several cases, these efforts led Native groups to actually join the anticolonial faction, such as the Nipmucks did when colonists attempted to confiscate the tribe's weapons.¹⁹

An alliance between the Podunks and the Narragansetts was not an unreasonable assumption. The Mohegan-Narragansett rivalry was among the deepest rifts when it came to intertribal relations at the outset of King Philip's War. In a potential war against the colonies, the Narragansetts would need allies who could keep the colonists distracted. Podunk involvement could expand the war further west along the Connecticut River, which would make fighting far more difficult for the United Colonies.²⁰ It is also possible that the Narragansetts living in Podunk and Hoccanum were not warriors at all, but that they simply took up residence there, starting families with the River Indians. Despite the political rifts between many Indian polities, families still formed across these divides.

With or without the Podunks, the war would expand into the Connecticut River Valley. After a battle against colonial and Mohegan forces, Metacom (a Wampanoag) and his fighters entered Nipmuck territory, whose lands were adjacent to that of the Pocumtucks. The Pocumtucks, known by colonists as the "Uplanders," had for many years worked with Massachusetts colonists. However, as the war broke out, they chose to side with Metacom.

¹⁸ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 57.

¹⁹ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 77.

²⁰ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 95-96.

James Drake suggested that this decision was made because of the Mohegans, rather than the colonists themselves, as the Pocumtucks were forced to choose between fighting alongside their rival Uncas or against the colonists with whom they had formed trade relationships.²¹ This change occurred only after the English of Springfield had attempted to confiscate the Pocumtucks' weapons. That these groups, which seem to have had better relationships with their colonial neighbors than the River Indians had with Connecticut's colonists, chose to fight against Uncas rather than with the colonists suggested that the River Communities would not have had much difficulty in deciding to "throw their lot with Philip."²² The Pocumtucks were also closely connected to the river communities, and their decision likely made some River Indians more likely to fight the colonists.

Connecticut's Council of War was swift in coming to the aid of Massachusetts, gathering a force and ordering Major Robert Treat on August 30 to "defend our confederates of the Massachusetts in the pursuit of those Indian enemies that are in open hostility against the English."²³ This plan, however, changed the following day when Christopher Crow, a colonist living on the east side of the Connecticut on Podunk lands, was "assaulted and shott at, by 4 Indians, 8 being in company, which occasioned the said Major Treatt to stop his forces at Windsor."²⁴ As a result, the Council of War halted the planned march to Springfield.

Uncertain of where the threat was coming from, or if the river communities were even involved at all, the council ordered Treat to divide his forces and send thirty soldiers to the

²¹ James Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 100.

²² Drake, *King Philip's War*, 100.

²³ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 357.

²⁴ Trumbull, 358.

Hoccanum, where, according to Uncas, the Narragansetts and Podunks had met a month earlier. An additional thirty men traveled west to the lands of the Tunxis, while another thirty went to Wethersfield, where colonists had once thrown out Sowheage, the Wangunk sachem, which had led to the 1637 Pequot raid on the settlement. The Council of War's confusion was apparent in their statements which read that "Indians whom they cannot know by face...have done hurt by suddain shooting at such travillours unawares."²⁵ The dispersal of Connecticut's forces to all three of the nearby river communities indicated that the colony was suspicious of all of them. Furthermore, the Council ordered that "whatsoever Indian or Indians with armes shall be espyed travelling in any of the precincts of our townships without an Englishman be with them...it shall be lawfull for the sayd English to shoot at them and destroy them for their owne safety."²⁶ Clearly, the English did not know who had shot at Crow, so they suspected any and all Natives. Like Connecticut, Massachusetts was also aggressive toward its local Indians, forcing many of the "Praying Indians" (Algonquians who had converted to Christianity) to relocate to Deer Island, off the coast of Boston. Plymouth colonists would routinely sell captured Wampanoags into slavery, even if the captives had in fact come to the colonists seeking to avoid the hostilities.²⁷

Over the course of the following month, Connecticut Colony sent emissaries to each of the river community settlements to secure their alliance in the war through offerings. On September 27, 1675, the war council declared that it had "come to an agreement with the Indians

²⁵ Trumbull, 359.

²⁶ Trumbull, 359.

²⁷ Christine DeLucia, *Memory Lands: King Philip's War and the Place of Violence in the Northeast* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 30-31.

of Farmington, Hartford, Wethersfeild and Midleton.”²⁸ The Tunxis resided around Farmington and Hartford, while Wethersfield and Middletown were both located on Wangunk lands. The Podunks, who lived closest to Christopher Crow’s own residence, were noticeably absent. This absence seemed to imply that the Podunks had shot at Crow, however, Crow had been attacked while “traveling between Hartford and Simsbury,” putting him on Tunxis lands.²⁹ Of course, it would not have been particularly difficult for the Podunks to make the approximately twenty-mile trip to Simsbury to go after Crow themselves. Another possibility was that a group beyond the river communities had come to the lower Connecticut, such as the forces that were besieging Springfield. In an attempt to stall Connecticut Colony’s reinforcements, some of these forces may have traveled south. While this explanation was unlikely, the events of the following year, namely the Burning of Simsbury, support this possibility. Regardless, the noticeable absence of the Podunks did not imply that they were at war with the colonies. Although there were several other tribes who might have shot at Crow, the Podunks seemed to be the prime suspect.

Despite the agreements made between Connecticut and the other two Native groups, the Wangunks and the Tunxis, colonists were still suspicious of them. Although these groups had agreed to “discover and destroy” Connecticut’s enemies, the Council of War spoke of “the Mohegans’ dissatisfaction with the Indians of the River, and their unwillingness to joyne with them in this war.”³⁰ This unwillingness suggested that the River Communities understood their agreement with the colony to be more along the lines of neutrality, in contrast to the Mohegans,

²⁸ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 370.

²⁹ Trumbull, 370.

³⁰ Trumbull, 372.

who were actively fighting alongside the colonists. Mohegan involvement might also have made River Indians less likely to join in the fighting, as many River Indian groups had fought the Mohegans in the past.³¹

Connecticut seemed to still suspect the Tunxis. Only two weeks after the agreements were made, the Tunxis were ordered “to be kept under the English watch and ward, for the prevention of being seduced or surprised by the Enemie, as some other Indians have been.”³² The reference to “other Indians” was especially interesting, as it suggested that some unexpected groups had joined the anticolonial alliance. Whether this was a reference to one of the river communities, or the Pocumtucks who were attacking Springfield at this time, remains unclear.³³

The Wangunks were similarly held in suspect by the colonists. Turramuggus, the sachem of the Wangunks, “was a pledged hostage, confined to a Hartford prison.”³⁴ However, simply because Connecticut took the Wangunk sachem hostage does not necessarily mean that their community was fighting, or planning to fight. The colonists even forced Uncas, perhaps the colonies’ staunchest native ally, to give up his weapons at Boston, and both Massachusetts and Connecticut took members of his family hostage, including his second son.³⁵ Since even Uncas was forced to give up some of his relatives to convince the English that he was not an enemy, Connecticut’s hostage-taking did not seem to suggest that the Wangunks were more likely to fight the colony than the other River Indians.

³¹ Eva L. Butler and Connecticut State Library: History and Genealogy Unit, *Letters of and about the Indians* (Groton: n.p., 1937).

³² Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 376.

³³ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 96-97.

³⁴ Paul Grant Costa and Tobias Glaza, ed., “Turramuggus,” The Native Northeast Portal, accessed August 7, 2019, <https://nativeneortheastportal.com/bio/bibliography/turramuggus>.

³⁵ Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 175.

From October 1675 to February 1676, the War Council recorded little regarding the river communities. Indeed, most of the fronts appeared to have been largely quiet over the winter in Southern New England, with many Native warriors in New York.³⁶ The most notable exception to this was the bloody “Swamp Fight” in December, in which a thousand-man colonial army, aided by Mohegans and Pequots, launched an attack on the Narragansetts. Colonists were still suspicious of them, as some Narragansetts had taken part in the hostilities and Narragansett leaders had hosted Wampanoag refugees.³⁷ The attack killed hundreds of Narragansett women and children “in a slaughter comparable only to the massacre at Mystic Fort forty years earlier.”³⁸ It was this horrific event that brought the Narragansetts into the war against the colonists. As Warren wrote: “Total Narragansett participation drastically altered the nature of the war in terms of its destructiveness and reach, representing far more than a phase in “King Philip’s” war.”³⁹ Due to the Narragansetts’ involvement, the spring of 1676 was far bloodier than the fall of 1675.

When the Narragansetts joined the war, the War Council grew even more concerned about the River Indians. A week after the Swamp Fight, the War Council declared that “it may be expected that the enemy may make some assault upon the plantations,” and called for a heightened garrisoning “on the east side the River.”⁴⁰ This redoubling of defenses seemed to have been in preparation for Narragansett retribution. However, Warren’s analysis suggested

³⁶ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 142.

³⁷ Leach, 117.

³⁸ Julie Fisher and David Silverman, *Ninigret: Sachem of the Niantics and Narragansetts: Diplomacy, War, and the Balance of Power in Seventeenth-Century New England and Indian Country* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 127.

³⁹ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 10.

⁴⁰ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 389.

that these fortifications were erected against a different threat. Warren extraordinarily detailed the terrain and different colonial and Indian paths on a map of the region.⁴¹ Of the three approaches into the Lower Connecticut River Valley that Warren highlighted, almost all came from the north. The only path to Hartford from Narragansett country went directly through Mohegan territory, which would not have been tenable. The Mohegans would have hardly allowed an enemy Narragansett force to pass through their lands to attack their colonial allies. Connecticut itself was likely unaware that this path could have been viable for a military force, since their forces had traveled by sea from Hartford to Narragansett territory.⁴² Therefore, these fortifications were probably erected to defend the much closer Podunks, and other Massachusetts tribes on the upper Connecticut, rather than the Narragansetts.

The fear of attack on the east side was warranted. On February 18, 1676, William Hill was shot at his home in Hoccanum. The house was not far from the spot where, in 1656, Uncas's army had been met by a Podunk force, though the encounter did not result in a battle.⁴³ In response to this attack, Connecticut redoubled its efforts, evacuating the eastern banks except for several garrisoned houses, listed as "Nath:Bissell's, Tho: Burnham's, Mr. John Crowe's, and at Nabuck, and Mr. Willys his farme."⁴⁴ When mapped out, this line of fortifications essentially followed the river south from Windsor to Wethersfield. It is important to note that many of these houses belonged to people with a history of dealing with the River Indians. Nathaniel Bissell was the

⁴¹ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 48-49.

⁴² Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 122-123.

⁴³ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 409-410.

⁴⁴ Trumbull, 410.

son of John Bissell—the “first man” to build a house on the east side of the river.⁴⁵ Thomas Burnham was the only individual allowed to keep the land that he had purchased from the Podunks, and John Crow had planned the resettlement of Hammonasett lands after his son, Christopher, had been shot on the west side of the river several months prior.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Samuel Wyllys, a key member of the colony, had benefitted from the Committee on Podunk lands and had purchased land from the Wangunks as well.⁴⁷ While each of these individuals had significant interactions with the River Indians, it was unclear whether Connecticut chose these houses to fortify because of their past relationships, or because they had the largest houses on the east side of the river.

The next attack that occurred on the Connecticut is perhaps the most famous—the Burning of Simsbury. It took place on March 26, a little over a month after the shooting of Hill. Early stories reported that Metacom was at Simsbury and watched the burning from a cave on a nearby mountain, although even a nineteenth century historian stated that “there is more of fiction than truth in this tradition. It is certain that Philip was not in this part of the country at this time.”⁴⁸ Historians today believed that the Narragansetts had burned the town.⁴⁹ In “Menowniet’s Examination,” the Native warrior, Menowniet, who was captured near Farmington, confessed to having led the group that attacked Simsbury.⁵⁰ He was half-

⁴⁵ Michael C. DeVito, *East Windsor, Through the Years* (Warehouse Point: The East Windsor Historical Society, Inc., 1968), 12.

⁴⁶ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 383.

⁴⁷ Trumbull, 377.

⁴⁸ Noah A. Phelps, *History of Simsbury, Granby, and Canton from 1643 to 1845* (Hartford: Press of Case, Tiffany, and Burnham, 1845), 24.

⁴⁹ Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 186.

⁵⁰ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 471.

Narragansett and half-Mohegan, and his group included Norwootucks, Agawams, and Nipmucks.⁵¹ He did not come to Connecticut from Narragansett territory, but rather from the north, having been involved in “the Hadly fight” in Massachusetts in the fall of 1675.⁵² From there, the group traveled south and shot at William Hill prior to burning down Simsbury.⁵³ Although the Narragansetts were involved in the fighting on the Connecticut, the fighting that took place around Hartford was more closely connected to the Springfield area, with both Native and colonial forces traveling up and down this corridor.

Menowniet’s party failed to include other River Indians. Except for Menowniet, the group was composed entirely of various Massachusetts Indians. Several Podunks might have moved north, as many Narragansetts had, and joined the growing alliance that was forming along the Upper Connecticut that included Wampanoags, Narragansetts, and Pocumtucks. Warren wrote that migrations of Wampanoags and Narragansetts to this area “changed the already loose groupings of tribal peoples based on intermarriage and shifting political loyalties.” Given that the Podunks did not possess the numbers of these two larger groups, it is possible that Podunk arrivals simply went unrecorded in the chaos of war, however, few from the other river communities seemed to join the anticolonial faction. The Tunxis, under close watch by the colony, would not have been able to wholly join, though some individuals within the group might have been able to slip away to the north. Instead, the Tunxis seems to have kept out of the war. As for the Wangunks, their lands had the least amount of conflict of the three groups, according

⁵¹ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 74.

⁵² Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 471.

⁵³ Trumbull, 472.

to the maps made by Warren. Although their sachem was taken hostage, they did not fight the colonists.⁵⁴

As the months passed, the anticolonial alliance began to fall apart. In May, the colonists attacked an anticolonial settlement that included Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Wampanoags. This attack, known as the Battle of Turner's Falls, killed hundreds of women and children. As the war seemed to be nearing its end, many more Indians joined the colonies. The newcomers included several warriors led by Ninigret, a Narragansett sachem who had managed to maintain neutrality despite substantial colonial suspicion. Three months after the Battle of Turner's Fall, one of these Native allies killed Metacom.⁵⁵

While the scale of conflict in the greater Hartford area seemed minimal, especially when compared to the battles fought around Rhode Island and Springfield, they had an impact on the war. Treat's army, Connecticut's main force, was twice kept from going to the aid of other colonies and instead, scoured the area for enemy warriors. It does not appear that these attempts were particularly effective since Menowniet's party remained in the region until August 1676. Moreover, perceived Podunk involvement led Connecticut to primarily guard its eastern half, allowing anticolonial warriors to burn down Simsbury, which was located on the western side of the River, without a fight.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Warren, *Connecticut Unscathed*, 58-59, 76.

⁵⁵ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 202-203, 235.

⁵⁶ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 357, 410, 471.

The Aftermath of the War

Although King Philip's War had a tremendous impact on New England, its exact impact might have been overstated by early historians. In Jean O'Brien's analysis of hundreds of local historical texts from the nineteenth century, 259 of them, or 58 percent, referenced King Philip's War to some degree.⁵⁷ O'Brien explained how many of the towns that wrote about the war "came into existence long after the conflicts had ceased," and thus had little need to discuss these events in their local histories.⁵⁸ Due to the high volume of references to King Philip's War in the region's texts, historians considered the war to be a key turning point in New England history. One such historian, Joseph Goodwin, wrote a noteworthy local history of the town of East Hartford, which was built on Podunk lands. Goodwin described the war as "the first grand effort of the Indians to exterminate the white men."⁵⁹ Written less than thirty years after De Forest's more comprehensive *History of the Indians of Connecticut*, De Forest was clearly Goodwin's source for most of his descriptions of Native history within East Hartford. Following De Forest's lead, Goodwin stated that the Podunks fought the colonists and that "few survived this disastrous war to return to their native haunts...it was virtually their end as a nation."⁶⁰ Goodwin used the war to offer a conclusive, dramatic end to a locale's Native history, when, in reality, a native presence remained in the region long after the war. Goodwin himself was aware that Podunk history in East Hartford continued past the Algonquian Uprising of 1675 when he acknowledged how "in

⁵⁷ Jean M. O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 27.

⁵⁸ O'Brien, *Firsting and Lasting*, 27.

⁵⁹ Joseph Goodwin, *East Hartford: Its History and Traditions* (Hartford: Press of Case, Lockwood, and Brainard Co, 1879), 31.

⁶⁰ Goodwin, *East Hartford: Its History and Traditions*, 37.

1760 the Podunks had entirely disappeared, merging into the tribes in the western part of the State, and losing their nationality.”⁶¹

New England histories were replete with moments in which Native history has been repeatedly brought to a dramatic end. New England historians redefined colonial massacres of Indians as efforts to purify the new land. The understanding of Indians as worthless savages affected more than just the way historians viewed these wars, for even colonists in their day viewed the farms Natives cultivated as “of little worth til the wisdom, labour, and estates of the English be improved upon it.”⁶² In this way, historians cut off Native history from colonial history and viewed Indians as only static placeholders across the region. While King Philip’s War was incredibly significant, with O’Brien arguing that it “closed the door on armed resistance for Indians from southern New England,” it was not the end of Native history in the region.⁶³

In the wake of this cataclysm, the River Indians changed tremendously, especially the Podunks. Many who left to fight in the war did not return to the Connecticut. Colonists sold the captives into slavery. A great majority of enslaved Natives went south to the Caribbean. Records show that one slave ship even traveled all the way to Tangiers, in modern day Morocco.⁶⁴ In the aftermath of the war, the colonies struggled to understand which Native groups they had defeated, “identifying legitimate targets for enslavement remained complicated...given the blurred lines between friend and foe.”⁶⁵ In *Brethren by Nature*, Margaret Newell addressed how

⁶¹ Goodwin, 37.

⁶² Paul Grant Costa and Tobias Glaza, ed., “Deed to Tunxis Sepos,” The Native Northeast Portal, accessed August 7, 2019, <http://nativenortheastportal.com/annotated-transcription/digcoll3294>.

⁶³ O’Brien, *Firsting and Lasting*, 33.

⁶⁴ Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk*, 336; DeLucia, *Memory Lands*, 320.

⁶⁵ Margaret Newell, *Brethren by Nature: New England Indians, Colonists, and the Origins of American Slavery* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 152.

some colonists had sold Indians who had fought on the colonial side. Despite their general neutrality, the river communities were at risk of colonial enslavement.

While some of the captured Algonquians were dispersed across the Atlantic, a majority of them stayed in New England under the direct protection of Uncas. Regarding captured warriors, Oberg wrote that “they were confronted a simple, stark choice: become Mohegan, or die; join with us, or face sale into West Indian slavery and a certain death far from home.”⁶⁶

Uncas, now quite elderly, had become truly dominant across Southern New England. Alliances with the colonies had enabled him to defeat the Pequots and Narragansetts and incorporate Hammonassetts, Pequots, and now Nipmucks and Wampanoags under his authority. Uncas’s treatment of his new subjects was controversial. Fitch, Connecticut Colony’s point of contact with Uncas in the 1670s, wrote that many of the new subjects suffered “under the yoake of Uncas his monarchy.”⁶⁷ Oberg, however, disagreed with Fitch’s assessment, writing that the tributary system which Fitch attacked “upset the minister’s emerging sense of the ideal order of things, a New England society where Englishmen were masters and Indians slaves.”⁶⁸ A tributary status to Uncas was likely a preferable alternative to slavery, despite the writings of contemporary colonial sources.

Some Algonquians managed to escape the United Colonies and Uncas. After the war, these Algonquians left New England to reside in adjacent areas. New York governor, Edmund Andros, offered a place called Schaghticoke for “all Indians...to live under the protection of the

⁶⁶ Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 192.

⁶⁷ Trumbull, *The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 593.

⁶⁸ Oberg, *Uncas: First of the Mohegans*, 195-196.

Government.”⁶⁹ Ironically, Schaghticoke was near where, in the winter of 1675, the Mohawks had attacked Metacom’s camp.⁷⁰ According to historian Evan Haefeli, “hundreds of Algonquians fled from the English and the Iroquois to find a refuge with the Pennacooks” in New Hampshire while others traveled as far north as New France, or modern day Canada.⁷¹ There was a certain level of crossover between the Schaghticoke and Northern communities. Some within these Northern communities, who Haefeli referred to as the “Algonquian Diaspora,” did occasionally return to Southern New England, and even raided the town of Deerfield where the Pocumtucks had once fought the colonists in King Philip’s War.⁷²

While there are many stories of Algonquians leaving New England or being resettled by Uncas, many River Indians did not disappear from their “native haunts,” but remained by the Connecticut River.⁷³ For instance, the Yale Indian Paper Series has records relating to the Podunks on the eastern side of the Connecticut well into the late eighteenth century. The last of these Papers is the “Complaint of Hana Squinimo,” in which Hana, the “wife of an Indian desesed man,” stated that the Burnhams, likely the sons or grandsons of the Thomas Burnham who had made the 1656 deal with Tontonimo, were keeping her from her lands.⁷⁴ Likewise, in Middletown, the Wangunks seem to have lived rather harmoniously with the English population, achieving a “successful coexistence” between the two communities through set

⁶⁹ Oberg, 195.

⁷⁰ Oberg, 195.

⁷¹ Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, “Wattanummon’s World: Personal and Tribal Identity in the Algonquian Diaspora c. 1660-1712,” *Papers of the Algonquian Conference* 25, no. 1 (1994): 215.

⁷² Haefeli and Sweeney, “Wattanummon’s World,” 221.

⁷³ Goodwin, *East Hartford*, 31

⁷⁴ Paul Grant Costa and Tobias Glaza, ed., “Complaint of Hana Squinimo,” The Native Northeast Portal, accessed August 7, 2019, <http://nativenortheastportal.com/annotated-transcription/digcoll3910>.

boundaries that the colonists respected.⁷⁵ The Wangunks were a small community that, after the war, were believed to have numbered a little over thirty, owned over fifty acres in two areas, and cultivated a number of fruit trees.⁷⁶ The Tunxis would also remain in and around Farmington in greater numbers, and they would play an important role in the Brotherhood movement in the 1700s.⁷⁷ Indeed, there was at least one person from the Tunxis who still lived in the Connecticut River Valley when De Forest wrote his history in the 1850s, although De Forest referred to him as a “miserable creature...perhaps the sole remnant of the tribe.”⁷⁸ In short, the river communities, although residing in drastically smaller lands, continued to live on the lower Connecticut River for centuries after the war.

Conclusion

The river communities played crucial roles in each of the major Native wars that occurred in New England between 1638 and 1675. Over this same time period, the River Indians faced tremendous pressure from the colonists, who had expanded far beyond the previously agreed upon land boundaries.⁷⁹ The involvement of the Podunks in King Philip’s War, and the neutrality of the Wangunks and Tunxis, caused Connecticut Colony to implement a lopsided defense of its cities, which resulted in the burning of Simsbury. Regardless, the war was not the

⁷⁵ Timothy Ives, “Reconstructing the Wangunk Reservation Land System: A Case Study of Native and Colonial Likeness in Central Connecticut,” *Ethnohistory* 58, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 67.

⁷⁶ Ives, “Reconstructing the Wangunk Reservation Land System: A Case Study of Native and Colonial Likeness in Central Connecticut,” 73.

⁷⁷ Linford Fisher, “Religion, Race, and the Formation of Pan Indian Identities in the Brothertown Movement, 1700-1800,” in *Native Diasporas: Indigenous Identities and Settler Colonialism in the Americas*, eds. Gregory D. Smithers and Brooke N. Newman (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 156.

⁷⁸ De Forest, *History of the Indians of Connecticut*, 375.

⁷⁹ Paul Grant Costa and Tobias Glaza, ed., “Petition of Tunix Indians to Connecticut General Assembly,” The Native Northeast Portal, accessed August 7, 2019, <http://nativenortheastportal.com/annotated-transcription/digcoll3828>.

end of a native presence in the lower Connecticut, for many continued to inhabit these lands for at least a century. Although historians have long overlooked the pivotal role of the Connecticut River Indians, their story presents a new perspective of this region—one in which Native Americans had to contend with the expansion of colonial powers. This narrative, highlighting a common theme in Native American history, also stresses the important intricacies of intertribal relations since individual communities, who were not regional powers, had to rely on systems of alliances with other tribes to safeguard their independence.